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THE CONTINUING MYTH OF EURO-SCEPTICISM? THE
GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT TWO YEARS
AFTER LISBON
BEKE ZWINGMANN*
Abstract The German Federal Constitutional Court’s 2009 decision on
the Lisbon Treaty immediately provoked passionate criticisms and revived
the Court’s image of the Eurosceptic par excellence. However, if one uses the
Court’s general case law on the interaction between European law and
German constitutional law—in particular the Mangold follow-up (Re
Honeywell) and the EURO bailout decision—as a background for analysis,
a high level of practical support becomes apparent, that is quite the opposite to
the all-out war some commentators predicted. It also illustrates how the
Lisbon principles can be used to exert a positive inﬂuence on the European
integration process.
I. INTRODUCTION
With its decisions Solange I1 in 1974 and Maastricht/Brunner2 in 1993, the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court, hereinafter
referred to as Bundesverfassungsgericht or the Court) acquired a reputation
for hostility towards the concept of supremacy of European law and the
European integration process that lingers to this day. Consequently, when
the constitutionality of the ratiﬁcation of the Lisbon Treaty was challenged, the
subsequent judgment3 was one of the most eagerly awaited in recent years.
So far, comments range from cautiously appreciative to passionately critical.
Using primarily the Brunner decision as comparator, a majority of
commentators criticized the apparent revival of the obstructive approach and
hostile attitude found in the earlier judgment and deplored that the Court
* Lecturer in Law & German/PhD candidate, Cardiﬀ Law School, zwingmannb@cardiﬀ.ac.uk.
This article developed from a conference paper presented at the SLS Annual Conference in Keele
in 2009. I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Robert Lee, and the anonymous reviewers
for their very helpful comments on the draft. All errors and omissions are my own.
1 Bundesverfassungsgericht (hereinafter abbreviated as BVerfG) Solange I, BVerfGE 37, 271
—reported in English as Internationale Handelsgesellschaft in [1974] 2 CMLR 540.
2 BVerfG Maastricht, BVerfGE 89, 155—reported in English as Brunner v European Union
Treaty in [1994] CMLR 57.
3 BVerfG Lissabon (Treaty of Lisbon), BVerfGE 123, 267. For the oﬃcial English translation
cf <http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 8 June
2012.
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seemed to have ‘thrown down the gauntlet’4 for an ‘all-out’ conﬂict in
particular with the ECJ.5 Overall, it was concluded, the Court lacks ‘a serious,
principled conviction that the deepening and strengthening of the European
integration by treaty reforms complies with the words and the spirit of the
German Constitution’.6
While comparisons with Brunner are of course valid, they tend to
overshadow the impact of the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s more general case
law on European issues in particular since 2005. When not dealing with
amendment treaties, but with the day-to-day application of European law, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht provides considerable practical support for its
application and enforcement as well as the development of the integration
process at national level. Two decisions in particular provided clariﬁcation in
this respect: the follow-up to Mangold (Re Honeywell)7 in July 2010 and the
EURO bailout decision8 in September 2011. Given the severe criticisms9
following the ECJ’s Mangold decision,10 this case was considered a perfect
opportunity for the Bundesverfassungsgericht to show whether it would follow
through on the threats perceived in the Lisbon decision. However, contrary to
the critics’ dire predictions, the Court contented itself with establishing rather
strict conditions for a successful ultra vires review and with matter-of-factly
concluding that, since the ECJ’s decision did not meet those criteria, it was still
a ‘binding interpretation of European law’.11 The EURO bailout case had a
similar outcome: the Court deferred to the political prerogative of the Federal
Parliament to assess whether such commitments were ﬁscally justiﬁable,
rejecting the arguments of the complainants that the Greek bailout and the
EURO stabilization package violated the core of the Germany’s ﬁscal
autonomy and thus its constitutional identity.12
These cases highlight that the Lisbon decision by itself or only in
conjunction with Brunner provides a context too restricted to take into account
4 Dimitrios Doukas, ‘The verdict of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the Lisbon
Treaty: not guilty, but don’t do it again!’ (2009) 34 ELR 879.
5 Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, ‘Bundesverfassungsgericht (2 BvE 2/08): ‘‘We want our identity
back’’—The revival of national sovereignty in the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision
on the Lisbon Treaty’ [2010] PL 548.
6 Christoph Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones At Sea’ (2009) 10
German Law Journal 1202.
7 BVerfG Ultra-vires Kontrolle Mangold, BVerfGE 126, 286—reported in English as Re
Honeywell in [2011] CMLR 33.
8 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (Greek aid measures/EURO rescue
package), case no 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1099/10 and 2 BvR 1485/10, decision of 07/09/
2011 [unreported], <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20110907_
2bvr098710.html> accessed 8 June 2012, for an English language press release cf: <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg11-055en.html> accessed 8 June 2012.
9 For further references cf eg Asterios Pliakos, ‘Who is the ultimate arbiter? The battle over
judicial supremacy in EU law’ (2011) 36 ELR 113.
10 ECJ Case C–144/04 Mangold, [2005] ECR I–9981.
11 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 60.
12 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 133–5.
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how the Court’s approach diﬀers when dealing with cases about competences
already transferred and those about changes yet to be implemented. This article
will therefore analyse the Lisbon decision within three scenarios to illustrate its
practical implications: the day-to-day application of European law by the
German Courts (II), the relationship of the German constitutional institutions to
each other and to the European institutions in the treaty system post-Lisbon
(III) and ﬁnally the future evolution of the integration process (IV). This will
allow a more realistic picture of the Court’s attitude towards European law and
European integration to emerge.
II. THE SPECTRE OF HOSTILITY
In Lisbon, the Bundesverfassungsgericht unequivocally conﬁrmed the
principle established in Solange II13 that ‘the primacy of application of
Union law only applies by virtue of, and in the context of, the constitutional
empowerment that continues in eﬀect’.14 This led to strong criticisms that the
Court would position itself for an all-out conﬂict especially with the ECJ, again
on the question of the prevalence of European law over the human rights
guarantees of the Grundgesetz (the German Federal Constitution).15 However,
considering the scope of the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the
concerns of the complainants in this respect were dealt with rather swiftly.
A short reference to well-established case law was all the Court deemed
necessary for an issue that, from the judges’ point of view, was obviously more
than clariﬁed already. Indeed, a closer look at this case law reveals the full
extent of the Court’s practical support for the enforcement of European law
once competences have been transferred to the European Union and are put
into action.
A. Judicial Cooperation in Action
Individuals insisted on bringing cases to convince the Bundesverfassungsge-
richt that it was time to reconsider their ‘as long as’ caveat established in
Solange II. The Court ﬁnally made it clear in the Bananas decision in 2000 that
it had no intention to do so—however harsh individual decisions of the ECJ
might seem compared to the standards of the Grundgesetz.16 The judges
unanimously held that for a reversal of Solange II a referring court needed
to provide a detailed evaluation of the level of human rights protection as
currently provided by the EC in order to show that it had dropped below the
Solange II standard in general, not just in individual cases.
13 BVerfG Solange II, BVerfGE 73, 339—reported in English as Re: Wünsche
Handelsgesellschaft in [1987] 3 CMLR 225.
14 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240 of the English version.
15 Doukas (n 4) 880.
16 BVerfG Bananenmarktordnung (Bananas) BVerfGE 102, 147.
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In their highly criticized17 decision on the German European Arrest
Warrant Act, the Court continued to develop its notion of the duties that fell
to the European Union and the national institutions with regard to the
protection of individual rights.18 While two of the dissenting judges showcased
eurosceptic19 and europhile20 alternatives respectively, the majority favoured
the more restraint approach visible in Bananas. At the same time, it
emphasized that the German authorities could not expect the same kind of
leniency: the German legislator had a duty to implement European law with the
highest consideration possible for the human rights of the individuals
concerned.21 By making use of the full extent of discretion conferred by the
Framework Decision in question, it would have been possible to comply with
both the requirements of the Framework Decision and the human rights
guarantees of the Grundgesetz, the latter being as binding for the German
legislator as the former. Not to have done so constituted a violation of the
complainant’s rights.22 The majority held the German implementation act to be
partly unconstitutional and declared it void in its entirety with immediate eﬀect.
A suspension, as suggested by dissenting Judge Lübbe-Wolﬀ,23 would
have been more in line with established precedents for such cases. Thus the
majority’s decision made it very clear that the German authorities remained
accountable to their obligations under the Grundgesetz as far as possible and
that the Court would not tolerate circumventions of the Grundgesetz’s
obligations under the opportune cover of supremacy whenever European law
was involved. This approach, incidentally, was endorsed two years later by the
ECJ in its own judgment on the validity of this Framework Decision, where
the court stated that it was up to the national implementation measures to
ensure suﬃcient human rights protection.24 Moreover, the majority’s
unusually harsh response stressed that the responsibility to fulﬁl Germany’s
17 Cf inter alia H. Satzger and T. Pohl, ‘The German Constitutional Court and the European
Arrest Warrant—Cryptic signals from Karlsruhe’ (2006) 4 ICJ 686; N Nohlen, ‘Germany: The
European Arrest Warrant case’ (2008) 6 ICJ 153; J. Vogel, ‘Europäischer Haftbefehl und deutsches
Verfassungsrecht’ [2005] JuristenZeitung 801; J. Masing, ‘Vorrang des Europarechts bei
umsetzungsgebundenen Rechtsakten’ [2006] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 264.
18 BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (European Arrest Warrant Act), BVerfGE
113, 273.
19 Judge Broß considered the German implementation act to be void because it went beyond
the requirements of the Framework Decision and thus violated the limits for integration established
in art 23 GG; BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), para 139 and 151 (para 140 and 152
of the English version).
20 To Judge Gerhardt the Act was suﬃciently open to interpretation so that the concerns of the
majority could have easily been met during its application, thus combining the duties under the
Grundgesetz with those under European law as emphasized by the ECJ in Case C–105/03 Pupino;
BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), paras 190, 195 and 200 (paras 191, 196 and 201 of
the English version).
21 BVerfG Europäisches Haftbefehlsgesetz (n 18), paras 80 and 83 (paras 81 and 84 of the
English version).
22 ibid paras 94 and 96 (paras 95 and 97 of the English version).
23 ibid paras 181 and 182 (paras 182 and 183 of the English version).
24 ECJ C–303/05 European Arrest Warrant, [2007] ECR I–3633, para 53.
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obligations as a Member state was primarily that of the legislative and the
executive, and not that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht—a position the Court
had already underlined more than a decade before in Brunner,25 but which the
German Parliament and Government seemed to have conveniently forgotten.
As will be seen below, this approach is carried through to the Lisbon decision
where the Court with even greater emphasis placed the primary ‘integration
responsibility’ squarely on the shoulders of the German Parliament and
Government.
In 2007, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had the opportunity to develop
further the principles outlined above when reviewing a statute creating a
greenhouse gas emissions trading system based on EC Directive 2003/87.26
Here the Court distinguished between the mandatory and non-mandatory
contents of the Directive and considered provisions of German national law
based on the latter to be still subject to the full review under the standards of the
Grundgesetz. However, with regard to the mandatory content, the principle of
supremacy prevented a constitutional review of the corresponding German
provisions.27 Therefore, the German courts had to review such provisions
for their compliance with Community human rights and, if necessary, make
a preliminary reference to the ECJ to have the validity of the underlying
Directive reviewed. Should it prove to be invalid, the ECJ’s decision would
then allow the Bundesverfassungsgericht to review the corresponding
provisions of German national law as well.28
This decision is a logical step for a court that has accepted the principle
of supremacy and its consequences as a reality of life and, following
the Bananas and European Arrest Warrant Act cases, perhaps not even a
surprising development. But given its persisting reputation for euro-hostility, it
is well worth highlighting that the Bundesverfassungsgericht took this step in
such clear terms, considering that it relinquished control over provisions of
genuine national law, one of its most important duties. With the number
of European directives ever increasing, a considerable amount of German
statute law will now no longer be subject to review. Aware of the possible
impact, the Bundesverfassungsgericht hastened to emphasize the need to use
the preliminary reference procedure to allow the ECJ to ﬁll a potential gap with
regard to human rights protection.
This line of reasoning has already been conﬁrmed in a case concerning the
German Telecommunications Act that inter alia implemented EC Directive
2006/24 on data retention. The complainants applied for interim relief to have
the application of the contentious German provisions suspended up to the
decision in the main action.29 The Bundesverfassungsgericht dismissed the
25 BVerfG Maastricht (n 2), 181–2, 186 and 211.
26 BVerfG Treibhausgas-Emissionshandel (Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System),
BVerfGE 118, 79. 27 ibid paras 69 and 71.
28 ibid para 72.
29 BVerfGE Data Retention, BVerfGE 121, 1 (order for interim relief).
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application in part. It held that its usually strict standards for interim relief
against statutes had to be even stricter when the respective provisions
implemented mandatory contents of a Directive because—as the Court did
not have the competence to declare EC law invalid—such an injunction would
actually give the complainants more than they could achieve in the main
action.30 Applying ECJ precedents on interim relief against secondary EC law,
the Court held that interim relief against German statutes implementing
mandatory contents of a Directive could only be granted if there was a risk to
the applicants of particularly serious and irreparable harm that outweighed the
severe impairment to the eﬀective operation of EC law.31
With this decision, the Court drew the procedural consequences of the
principles developed in the cases outlined above: if a substantive review of the
provisions in question is not admissible, then it should be very diﬃcult to use
the negative consequences of such provisions as an argument to suspend their
application to the complainant. Incidentally, the judges do not acknowledge
their use of the principle of indirect eﬀect, even though their reasoning clearly
reﬂects the ECJ’s case law on interim relief.32 As this decision was issued
before Lisbon, it will be interesting to see whether the Court’s approach in this
respect changes in future.
B. Creative Use of National Remedies
Complementing the approach outlined above, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
developed principles on enforcing the duties of the German courts under
the preliminary reference procedure. While the ECJ has made eﬀective use
of Article 267 TFEU, the court still largely depends on the goodwill of
the national courts, as there is no direct enforcement mechanism. By using
the so-called ‘right to the lawful judge’ enshrined in the Grundgesetz,33 the
Bundesverfassungsgericht created the means to ﬁll just this gap for the German
context.
The right to the lawful judge prohibits the hand-picking of judges for
particular cases in order to prevent any inside or outside manipulation of
the due process of justice.34 It requires every single German court, including
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, to adopt general rules that allow the speciﬁc
determination of the presiding judge for each case before the case reaches the
court. He or she then becomes the lawful judge, ie the only judge who is
allowed to hear the case. In case the respective judge declares an interest or is
30 Incidentally, at that time, the Directive was already under review: ECJ Case C–301/06
Ireland v Council and EP, 10/02/2009 (validity conﬁrmed).
31 BVerfG Data Retention (n 29), para 145.
32 Based on ECJ Case C–465/93 Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft, [1995] ECR I–3761.
33 Art. 101 (1) 2 GG.
34 Ralf Müller-Terpitz ‘Art. 101’ in Bruno Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hans Hofmann, and Axel
Hopfauf (eds), Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (12th edn, Carl Heymanns Verlag 2011) para 5.
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otherwise disqualiﬁed, an equally predetermined judge has to take over the
case. If a party in a particular case is deprived of his or her lawful judge in an
arbitrary fashion, the resulting judgment may be challenged before the
Bundesverfassungsgericht, which in turn may annul the decision and have the
case decided again.35 In Solange II, the Bundesverfassungsgericht extended
this guarantee to include the ECJ. Given the ECJ’s monopoly jurisdiction with
regard to the interpretation and validity of EC law and its responsibility to
provide human rights protection for individuals, it had become part of the
system of legal remedies available in Germany. In order for the right to the
lawful judge to remain an eﬀective guarantee, it had to include the ECJ as well.
Consequently, a decision not to make a preliminary reference based on
arbitrary considerations may constitute a violation of this right and thus allow
the resulting judgment to be challenged via constitutional complaint.36
Subsequently, the Bundesverfassungsgericht clariﬁed that it did not intend
to use this remedy to establish itself as a ‘supreme reference control court’.37
Therefore, decisions would be considered ‘arbitrary’ only where the duty to
refer had been handled in a ‘manifestly untenable manner’.38 Referring to the
ECJ’s jurisprudence on the duties of courts of last instance with regard to
preliminary references39 the Bundesverfassungsgericht established that such a
manifest violation had to be assumed in particular in three cases: the respective
court of last instance had
1) misunderstood its duty to refer in principle—this would be the case if the
court had realized the relevance of the question for the decision and had had
doubts as to the correct answer but did not even consider to refer; or
2) had refused to refer (again), while consciously derogating from established
ECJ case law—this was for example the case in Kloppenburg40 where
the Bundesverfassungsgericht annulled a decision of the Federal Tax Court,
the latter having refused to give direct eﬀect to a European directive
deliberately contradicting a decision of the ECJ to that eﬀect following their
own reference;41 or
3) in cases without relevant ECJ case law, where the court’s judgments had
not provided an exhaustive answer to the relevant question or where there
was more than a remote possibility of the ECJ developing its case law
further—exceeded the acceptable margin of appreciation in an untenable
manner; this would especially be the case if the possible interpretations
35 ibid (n 33) paras 18–19. 36 BVerfG Solange II (n 13), 366–9.
37 BVerfG Case 2 BvR 808/82, [1988] Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1456, 1471; reported in
English as Re patented Feedingstuﬀs in [1989] 2 CMLR 902.
38 BVerfG Absatzfonds (Agricultural Sales Funds) BVerfGE 82, 159, para 135 (phrase
translated by author).
39 Cf especially ECJ Cases 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 and 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987]
ECR 4199.
40 BVerfGE 75, 223. 41 ECJ Case 70/83 Kloppenburg [1984] ECR 1075.
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of EC law not adopted by the court were clearly preferable to the one
adopted.42
With this simple mechanism, the Bundesverfassungsgericht had created an
easily accessible remedy for individuals that forced the German courts to fully
implement the changeover in jurisdiction from the Bundesverfassungsgericht
to the ECJ and ensured that this would not be detrimental to the human rights
protection of an individual. Since then, a great number of German courts have
made preliminary reference requests, so one could argue that this might have
worked just a little bit too well for the ECJ’s taste.43
In 1995, the Bundesverfassungsgericht expanded on this remedy in the case
of T. Port.44 The German administrative courts had rejected the company’s
applications for interim relief under the EC regulation establishing the market
regime for bananas, arguing that the validity of this EC Regulation had been
conﬁrmed by the ECJ,45 which left them with no options to grant interim relief
to the applicant. The Bundesverfassungsgericht held in favour of Port that
irrespective of the question of validity, the EC Regulation was suﬃciently open
to interpretation regarding cases of hardship.46 It followed that the courts
should have made a reference to the ECJ to ascertain under which conditions
the Regulation would allow such cases to be taken into account and in general
under which conditions interim relief against EC law could be granted.47 That
they had not done so was a violation of the complainant’s rights.48 This case
highlights that the Bundesverfassungsgericht saw the preliminary reference
procedure not merely as a procedural step or a convenient opportunity but as an
important tool for the German courts to be used creatively to ensure the highest
standard of human rights protection possible, while at the same time allowing
European law to be implemented eﬀectively. The decision provided an early
hint at the strict standards developed subsequently in the European Arrest
Warrant Act and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading System cases.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht reﬁned this line of case law over the years,
increasing the burden of proof for both courts and complainants in order to
42 BVerfG Absatzfonds (n 38) para 137.
43 Cf the statistics on preliminary reference numbers in the ECJ’s annual report 2010, 103–4:
between 1952 and 2010, the ECJ received 7005 preliminary references. Of this total number, 1802
references came from German courts alone, representing more than 25%. The closest ‘runner up’
is Italy with 1056 references (about 15%). British courts have referred 505 times (about 7%);
<http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-05/ra2010_stat_cour_ﬁnal_en.pdf>
accessed 8 June 2012.
44 BVerfG T. Port, Case no: 2 BvR 2689/94 and 2 BvR 52/95, [1995] Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 950–1.
45 ECJ Case C–280/93 Germany v Council [1994] ECR I–4973.
46 BVerfG (n 44) 951.
47 Following this judgment, the Regional Administrative Court made a preliminary reference to
the ECJ to obtain the required guidance: Case C–68/95 T. Port GmbH & Co. KG [1996] ECR
I–6065.
48 Speciﬁcally his right to property (art 14 GG) and the right to have access to eﬀective legal
remedies (art 19 (4) GG).
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ensure admittance of all those cases that it considered important without
opening the ﬂoodgates to obviously unfounded complaints. It clariﬁed for
example that a court that did not acquire adequate knowledge about the
relevant European law, substantive law as well as methods of interpretation,
typically misunderstood its duty to refer in principle.49 Also, a court had to
provide detailed reasons for its decision not to make a reference, so that the
Bundesverfassungsgericht could conduct a proper review of the eﬀorts the
court took in solving the questions of European law raised by the case before
it.50 At the same time, a court did not exceed the acceptable margin of
appreciation simply because the interpretation adopted by the court was not
the one favouring the complainants. If the court had based its interpretation
of European substantive law on established principles of application and
interpretation of European law, there could be no violation of the right to the
lawful judge as in that case the procedural decision not to make a reference
could not impact on the substantive outcome of the case.51 For the subsequent
complaint this meant that the complainants had to provide suﬃcient evidence
as to why a diﬀerent interpretation was so obviously preferable to the one
adopted by the court.52
In a decision in February 2010, a chamber of the First Senate of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht suggested to shift the focus away from the ap-
plication of European law and to take a more procedural view. The judges
argued that the crucial issue was whether the court in question had adhered to
the duty on courts of last instance to refer as interpreted by the ECJ.53 They
concluded that in the case before them the court had violated that duty as they
had not provided suﬃcient explanation for their decision not to refer despite
the fact that the issue under consideration had not been exhaustively answered
in the jurisprudence of the ECJ.54 However, this approach was rejected a few
months later by the Second Senate in the Mangold decision mentioned in the
introduction.55 The judges recalled their refusal to act as a ‘supreme reference
control court’ and merely to focus on the formalistic adherence to the duty to
refer. They insisted that the criteria established by the ECJ in CILFIT56 did not
oblige the Court to create a remedy for merely procedural violations. Hence,
49 BVerfG Case no 1 BvR 1036/99, order of 09/01/2001, para 21. <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20010109_1bvr103699.html> accessed 8 June
2012.
50 ibid para 19.
51 BVerfG Case no 1 BvR 2722/06, order of 20/02/2008, paras 31 and 48 <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20080220_1bvr272206.html> accessed 8 June
2012.
52 Cf the examination of the complainant’s arguments in BVerfG (n 49) paras 32–48.
53 BVerfG Case no: 1 BvR 230/09, order of 25/02/2010, para 20. <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20100225_1bvr023009.html> accessed 8
June 2012. 54 ibid para 24.
55 BVerfG Mangold (n 7). For a more detailed discussion of the decision cf below Part III B
‘Actions of European institutions under review’.
56 ECJ Case 283/81 CILFIT (n 39).
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national courts retained the same margin of discretion for the interpretation of
European law as they did for the interpretation of national law, subject of
course to their duties to follow established principles of application and
interpretation of European law. Therefore, the standard of constitutional review
was also the same as it was in purely national contexts, ie the Court reviewed
only the potential arbitrariness of the court’s decision, not whether the
Bundesverfassungsgericht itself might have decided otherwise had it been the
trial judge.57
This latter approach highlights that the aim in policing the national courts
with regard to preliminary references is not to impose yet another procedural
burden, but to avoid the outcome that a lack of supervision in the aftermath of
Solange II and Bananas would allow violations of the rights of individuals to
go uncorrected by the ECJ. This leads to the Bundesverfassungsgericht judging
the ‘correctness’ of the application and interpretation of European law, which is
clearly the ECJ’s jurisdiction.58 However, it is argued that this approach is still
compatible with the ECJ’s own approach in the area of state liability in that the
failure to refer in itself does not constitute a suﬃciently serious breach but has to
be seen in context of the application of European law adopted by the court in
question.59 The decision in C–154/08 Commission v Spain is a case in point.
The ECJ had held Spain to be in breach of its obligations under European law
due to an interpretation adopted by the Spanish Tribunal Supremo. The Spanish
Government had argued that they were not able to interfere in favour of
European law, since the Spanish constitution guaranteed judicial independence.
Relying on the primacy of European law, the ECJ rejected this argument.60
Consequently, if the Bundesverfassungsgericht were to decide that a court had
not violated the right to the lawful judge due to the interpretation adopted, the
complainant in question could always initiate state liability proceedings where
the court then could refer to the ECJ and have the previous decisions reviewed,
including that of the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
C. A Consistent Policy of Self-Restraint
In conclusion, it is submitted that the case law on the day-to-day application
of European law as outlined above does not support the claim that the
Bundesverfassungsgericht to this day pursues an unrelentingly hostile course
and is set on an all-out conﬂict with the ECJ. Quite the contrary, it has accepted
supremacy, and the subsequent loss of its own powers, as a reality of life.
The standard for review established in Solange II makes a reversal quite
57 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 89.
58 Inter alia Dieter Grimm, ‘Defending Sovereign Statehood against Transforming the Union
into a State’ (2009) 5 EuConst 357.
59 Case C–224/01 Köbler [2003] ECR I–10239, para 53–5; Case C–173/03 Traghetti [2006]
ECR I–5177, para 32.
60 Case C–154/08 Commission v Spain [2009] ECR I–187, para 125.
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improbable.61 Moreover, the Court ensured that the ECJ could eﬀectively
exercise its role as human rights protector by adapting national remedies to
prevent the German courts from circumventing their duties in this respect. At
the same time, these adaptations provided a remedy for individuals to enforce
the courts’ obligations with regard to an eﬀective application of European law
and to the interpretation of national law in line with European law. Therefore,
the practical consequences of the Court’s insistence to root supremacy ﬁrmly in
national law and not autonomously in European law should be negligible.
The controversial ‘relationship of co-operation’ established by Brunner
appears to consist in the Bundesverfassungsgericht leaving everything else to
the ECJ and focusing on the one issue the ECJ has no jurisdiction to review:
the compliance of national laws and of actions of national authorities with the
Grundgesetz in those cases where the compliance with European law cannot be
faulted. The Court seems determined to use the limited options remaining at its
disposal to prevent the competence transfer to the European Union from
leading to a gap in the system of remedies available to individuals in Germany.
The cases outlined above have proven to be a harsh reminder for the Federal
Government, Parliament and the German courts that fulﬁlling Germany’s
obligations as a Member State is not an excuse to fail in their obligations under
the Grundgesetz.
In the next part, it will be considered how the principle of openness towards
European law introduced by the Lisbon decision will inﬂuence the Court’s
assessment, and its course of action, when reviewing provisions of German law
or the actions of German institutions.
III. THE COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
As seen in the previous part, the case law on the day-to-day application
of European law does not support the myth of euro-scepticism on the part
of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Within certain limits, it allows the German
courts a considerable margin of appreciation on how best to fulﬁl their duties
with regard to both European law and the Grundgesetz. However, as the Lisbon
decision shows, the Court is not inclined to allow the German Federal
Parliament and Government a similar freedom when creating those oblig-
ations. It insists that the Grundgesetz’s concept of checks and balances be
maintained as far as possible by establishing a system of strict supervision
of the Federal Government’s activities in particular by the Bundestag, the
lower house of the Federal Parliament. Moreover, the Court illustrated its
apprehensions with regard to the activities of the European institutions and
of the German representative in the Council by reaﬃrming the existing
61 For a similar assessment cf eg Frank Schorkopf, ‘The European Union as an Association of
Sovereign States: Karlsruhe’s Ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal
1230.
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ultra vires review power and by introducing the so-called identity review.
These controversial claims tend to overshadow the practical support provided
elsewhere and led many commentators to call into question or even deny the
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s commitment to European integration.62
However, as will be seen, the supervisory functions of the Bundestag are not
so onerous as to grind the Union’s decision-making processes to a halt and the
review powers are not likely to develop into a threat, at least not for the
European institutions. Also, the developments in the case law since Lisbon
clearly show the inﬂuence of some of its elements that have been
underestimated so far: the mandate to integrate and the principle of openness
towards European law (Grundsatz der Europarechtsfreundlichkeit).
A. The Principle of Openness towards European Law
Given the Court’s persisting image as hostile towards European integration,
the characterization of the Grundgesetz’s stance as a ‘mandate to integrate’
constitutes perhaps the most surprising part of the Lisbon judgment. It would
have been easier to simply recall Brunner and then to allow the Lisbon Treaty
to pass, subject to the previously established provisos. Instead, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht stressed that German participation in various
forms of peaceful international cooperation and integration was not
‘tantamount to submission to alien powers’,63 but was in fact a realization of
the Grundgesetz’s notion of sovereignty.64 For the European Union, the Court
goes even further and unequivocally asserts the Grundgesetz’s commitment to
European integration, a commitment that binds all of Germany’s constitutional
institutions, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself:
The constitutional mandate to realise a united Europe (. . .) means in particular for
the German constitutional bodies that it is not left to their political discretion
whether or not they participate in European integration. The [Grundgesetz] wants
European integration (. . .). Therefore (. . .) the principle of openness towards
European law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) applies.65
The characterization of this commitment as a constitutional mandate and
as part of a constitutional principle emphasizes the importance that the
Bundesverfassungsgericht attaches to the process of European integration
and Germany’s participation in it.66 Such principles represent fundamental
value decisions of the Grundgesetz that play a vital role in the interpretation
of individual constitutional provisions and in the assessment of the
62 ibid (n 60) 1238, also Schönberger (n 6).
63 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 220 of the English version.
64 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 219–26.
65 ibid para 225 of the English version, emphasis added.
66 Daniel Thym, ‘In the name of sovereign statehood: a critical introduction to the Lisbon
judgment of the German Constitutional Court’ (2009) 46 CMLRev 1807.
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constitutionality of actions under review,67 as can be seen in Brunner and
Lisbon where the Court uses the principle of democracy to great eﬀect.
Although, unlike the latter, this new principle of openness is not part of
the unalterable core, its status as a constitutional principle means that
the Federal Government and Parliament, the German courts, but also the
Bundesverfassungsgericht itself, will have to consider it whenever European
law is involved. In the Lisbon decision, the Court links the principle of
openness towards European law to the principle of loyal cooperation and
introduces it as a limit to its review powers. However, it does not provide much
further information on its scope or how exactly this new principle is going to
inﬂuence the decision making of the German institutions.68 Within the context
of the mandate to integrate, it seems to create an overall presumption in favour
of the European Union, which could make it a powerful tool for the Federal
Government and Parliament as well as the Bundesverfassungsgericht to
promote European integration in various ways.
The following sections will examine issues where recent case law has
begun to shape the remit of the new principle: the review powers of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and the so-called integration responsibility in
particular of the Bundestag.
B. Actions of European Institutions under Review
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s review powers are one of the most
controversial issues of its general approach to European law. Since their
ﬁrst appearance in Brunner,69 they have sparked passionate debates among
academics. However, up to the Lisbon decision, only two cases were ever
brought before the Court where actions of EC institutions were challenged
for being ultra vires. The ﬁrst one was a complaint in 1998 against the Council
vote that conﬁrmed the introduction of the Euro. The second one was a
Constitutional Complaint of the Alcan Company against a judgment of the
Federal Administrative Court that had relied on a preliminary ruling decision
of the ECJ70 to order the repayment of unlawfully paid state aid. The
Bundesverfassungsgericht refused to admit either case for decision, summarily
rejecting the ultra vires argument in both cases since the contested decisions
were obviously covered by a competence previously transferred: to the Council
in the Treaty of Maastricht regarding the introduction of the Euro and to the
ECJ to enforce the Commission’s competence in Article 88 EC (Article 108
TFEU).71 These cases demonstrate an approach similar to Solange II/Bananas
67 Cf eg Axel Hopfauf ‘Einleitung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofmann, and Hopfauf, Kommentar
zum Grundgesetz (n 34) para 88. 68 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240.
69 BVerfG Maastricht (n 2) 188.
70 ECJ Case C–24/95 Re: Alcan, [1997] ECR I–1591.
71 BVerfG EURO, Case no: 2 BvR 532/98, 22 June 1998, para 7 <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk19980622_2bvr053298.html> accessed 8 June
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in the area of human rights. The Bundesverfassungsgericht apparently did not
intend to allow the ultra vires review to be used as an opportune tool to attempt
to reverse developments of the integration process merely because they seemed
undesirable to the complainants.
At ﬁrst glance, Lisbon seems to reverse this trend and to bring the distrust
prevalent in Brunner back to the fore: the Court reaﬃrmed that it considered it
its duty to oﬀer remedies against ultra vires actions of European institutions
and, from now on, also against actions that violated the Grundgesetz’s
constitutional identity.72 However, unlike in Brunner, the Court set two
conditions: any applicant had to exhaust the remedies available to them
on European Union level ﬁrst and the reviews followed the principle of
openness towards European law. Under these narrow conditions, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht considered its review powers not to be a violation
of the principle of loyal cooperation.73 Most critics considered these conditions
mere window dressing, focused on the fact that the Court had reaﬃrmed its
review powers and consequently suspected the Court of intending to escalate
its relationship with the ECJ.74 It was noted in particular that the Court had
broadened the range of actions that could be subjected to review75 and seemed
prepared to use those powers more actively and very likely in a way that would
breach the ECJ’s monopoly on the interpretation of the Treaties.76 Others were
slightly more optimistic, but still cautioned that the Bundesverfassungsge-
richt’s assertion to be the ultimate arbiter of the action’s compatibility with the
Grundgesetz left the Court only very limited options to exercise those powers
in accordance with the European Treaties.77
Based on only the Lisbon decision some of these criticisms might have been
justiﬁed, but since the decisions on Mangold and the EURO bailout most of
them have turned out to be misinterpretations of the Court’s intentions.
1. The ultra vires review post-Mangold
Mangold dealt with a constitutional complaint from an employer against a
decision of the Federal Labour Court that had relied on the ECJ’s Mangold
decision to set aside the German law in question. With one judge dissenting,
the Bundesverfassungsgericht dismissed the case.78 The judges emphasized
that according to Lisbon the ultra vires review was to be conducted subject to
2012; and BVerfG Alcan Case no: 2 BvR 1210/98, 17 February, 2000, para 23; <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20000217_2bvr121098.html> accessed 8 June
2012. 72 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 240.
73 ibid para 340. 74 Inter alia Thym (n 65) 1821.
75 Schorkopf (n 60) 1232.
76 Jacques Ziller, ‘The German Constitutional Court’s Friendliness towards European Law—
On the Judgment of Bundesverfassungsgericht over the Ratiﬁcation of the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2010)
16 EPL 72. 77 Schorkopf (n 74).
78 BVerfG Mangold (n 7).
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the principle of openness towards European law and then set out the resulting
procedural and substantive conditions.
Since the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to adhere to the decisions of the
ECJ as binding interpretation of European law as a matter of principle, the
Court had to give the ECJ the opportunity via a preliminary reference to rule on
the validity and the interpretation of the contested measure, prior to their own
decision in the case.79 Deliberately adopting the same phraseology the ECJ
uses with regard to state liability, the Court then clariﬁed that a measure
could only be declared inapplicable if it was ‘manifestly’ ultra vires, ie violated
the principle of conferral and thus the existing competence structures in a
‘suﬃciently serious’80 manner. Such a suﬃciently serious violation was
‘contingent on the act of the authority of the European Union being manifestly in
breach of competences and the impugned act leading to a structurally signiﬁcant
shift to the detriment of the Member States in the structure of competences.’81
The Court pointed out that such a shift could not occur simply because the ECJ
used its powers—transferred after all by the treaties—to interpret and apply
European law, inter alia by relying on the common legal traditions of the
Member States. Indeed, in the area of human rights, such a jurisprudential
method had long been the only possible means to develop the necessary level
of protection.82 Moreover, the particular position of the ECJ as a supranational
court demanded respect for the ECJ’s own methodology and its authority to
interpret European law. Hence, interpretations of European law had to be
accepted that—while not following the methods of interpretation traditionally
used—avoided a structural shift in the manner deﬁned above.83 Dissenting
Judge Landau criticized these criteria for excluding the more realistic scenario
of a gradual erosion of Member State powers over time that, when combined,
caused a manifest violation of the competence structures—as illustrated
‘perfectly’ by the ECJ’s Mangold case.84
Applying those criteria, the Court concluded that the ECJ had not acted ultra
vires. As it was for the ECJ to decide whether a particular national measure
fell within the area of application of European law, Member States could not
remove said measure from the ECJ’s control simply because they used the
measure to pursue aims that the European Union had no competence to
79 ibid para 60. Such an approach had also been suggested directly after Lisbon by eg Ziller (n
75) 71; Schorkopf (n 60) 1234.
80 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 61. The oﬃcial English translation referred to in (n 81) uses at
this point the phrase ‘suﬃciently qualiﬁed’, but the context makes it clear that it should read
‘suﬃciently serious’.
81 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) quoted after headnote 1 a) of the English version, <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106en.html> accessed 8 June
2012. 82 ibid para 63.
83 Eg because they were limited to individual cases, and either did not impact on the Human
Rights of the individuals involved or allowed for compensation at national level; BVerfGMangold
(n 7) paras 66 and 108. 84 ibid para 108.
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regulate. Hence, in this case, the substantive scope of the underlying European
legislation was the crucial factor, not the intentions of the German legislator
when enacting the national law in question.85 Also, the conclusions drawn by
the ECJ—that even before the time limit for implementation had passed,
national law that conﬂicted with a directive had to be set aside—merely
continued on from the principles developed already in eg CIA Security86 and
Unilever.87 Even if one were to assume that the ECJ in Mangold had gone
beyond a methodologically justiﬁable development of existing primary and
secondary European law, this would only constitute a ‘suﬃciently serious’
violation if it were to create new competences for the European Union in the
process. However, by enacting the secondary law at issue, the European
legislators had already created the necessary legal structures that formed the
basis of the ECJ’s interpretation.88
This decision represents a consistent follow-up to the reasoning of Lisbon
where the Court indicated inter alia that the mandate to integrate required
national judicial power to be limited so as not to threaten the integration
process and in particular bound national courts to respect the jurisprudence of
the ECJ89—limitations that are echoed by the conditions set inMangold.90 The
mandate to integrate and the principle of openness towards European law are
clearly meant to be more than mere lip service and are developing a
considerable inﬂuence over the activities of the German institutions, including
the Bundesverfassungsgericht itself.91
Mangold also links the Lisbon decision to the development already seen in
the area of human rights. The review powers, claimed as a matter of principle,
were not to be used lightly, but with great consideration, deference even, for
the role of the ECJ the decisions of which are declared binding unless the very
high threshold of a ‘suﬃciently serious violation’ can be overcome. Given that
the Court already approved the changes to the Union’s competence structure
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, an action that could cause such a ‘structural
shift’ is diﬃcult to imagine and thus makes it very unlikely that future actions
of European institutions will be considered ultra vires.92 Indeed, the European
institutions, including the ECJ, are left with considerable leeway to develop the
integration process in their usual proactive manner. The pointed comment that
it was for the ECJ, and not the national legislator, to decide what part of
national law would fall within the remit of European law will not go unnoticed
85 ibid paras 73–4. 86 Case C–194/94 [1996] ECR I–2201.
87 Case C–443/98 [2000] ECR I–7535. 88 BVerfG Mangold (n 7) paras 77–9.
89 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 337 and 333 respectively.
90 For a similar conclusion cf Mehrdad Payandeh, ‘Constitutional review of EU law after
Honeywell: contextualizing the relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU
Court of Justice’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 27.
91 As predicted by Philipp Kiiver, ‘German Participation in EU Decision-Making after the
Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance Procedures’ (2009) 10
German Law Journal 1291 and Ziller (n 75) 55.
92 As pointed out by dissenting Judge Landau, BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 103.
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by the German authorities. It should also reassure critics that the Court’s
perception of the balance of power between the ECJ and itself is far more
realistic and pragmatic than they assumed. In this light, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the review powers not only could serve to help supervise the
activities of the German representative in the Council but might also promote
the development of European law in a similar fashion to the use of the
preliminary reference procedure.93
While such critics could be tempted to comment cynically that this is merely
the Bundesverfassungsgericht shying away from asserting in practice the
review powers it so emphatically claims on paper,94 there is no denying that the
Mangold decision answered many questions about the Court’s intentions with
regard to maintaining a cooperative dialogue with the European institutions.
This is so particularly since the Court issued theMangold decision four months
after the ECJ handed down its decision in C–518/07 Commission v Germany.
In that case, the German Government had suggested that for the ECJ to adopt
an interpretation contrary to the one they had adopted for the implementation
of the European directive in question would essentially constitute an ultra vires
act.95 Predictably, the ECJ was unimpressed by this veiled threat and found
Germany in breach of its obligations.96 For the Bundesverfassungsgericht
to then take such a decided stance in Mangold clearly shows that the
Court never intended to allow the controversies between the ECJ and itself to
become more than a constructive debate about the relationship of European
and national law. More importantly, however, it sends a strong signal to the
German authorities that the Court will not allow the Federal Government to use
the review powers as a convenient threat to hold over the European institutions
in order to avoid consequences resulting from the use of the very competences
that the German institutions agreed to transfer. Moreover, the Federal
Government cannot expect that the Bundesverfassungsgericht will naturally
side with its interpretation of a particular act being ultra vires or in violation of
the Grundgesetz’s identity. Again, the initially highlighted distinction in the
approach of the Bundesverfassungsgericht comes to the fore: a high level of
support once the competences have been exercised, while aiming to maintain a
greater inﬂuence of the Grundgesetz at an earlier stage.
2. The EURO bailout and the identity review
The Court introduced the other limb of the review powers in order to allow the
preservation of the speciﬁc constitutional identity of the Grundgesetz against
actions that appear to violate the limits to integration as set out in the Lisbon
93 Kiiver (n 910); Ziller (n 76) 71.
94 As done by dissenting Judge Landau, BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 103.
95 Case C–518/07 Commission v Germany, [2010] ECR I–1885 para 48. Cf for further
comments also Pliakos (n 9) 111.
96 Commission v Germany (n 94) paras 50–1.
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decision.97 This may concern either procedural or substantive issues, eg that
the German representative participated in the Council without prior instruction
by the Bundestag (cf. below) or that the action in question infringed the
necessary ‘space for the political formation of the economic, cultural and social
circumstances of life’.98 Due to the European Union’s ‘blindness’ regarding
the national constitutional set-up of its Member States, such actions could
normally not be considered ultra vires as they would be covered by
competences actually transferred and thus valid despite the violation of
national constitutional limits.99 Hence, the Court introduced the identity review
as a remedy to address these situations. Unfortunately, the only eﬀective
way the Bundesverfassungsgericht saw to achieve this was to threaten the
inapplicability of the resulting European act within Germany. However, like
the ultra vires review, the identity review is subject to two conditions: it will
only be available if remedies at Union level fail and it is subject to the principle
of openness towards European law.
The 2011 EURO bailout decision was the ﬁrst case where the arguments
of the complainants revolved around the identity core of the constitution.
However, owing to its particular setting, it is probably not as reliable a
guideline as Mangold is for the ultra vires review. The Court considered
admissible only the challenges against the German statutes implementing the
decision of the European Council about the ﬁnancial aid for Greece (‘Greek
bailout’) and the decision of the Members of the Eurozone to enhance the
stability of the Euro (‘EURO stabilization package’) and only on the grounds
of a violation of the identity of the democratic principle. The challenges
directly against the acts of the European institutions for being ultra vires were
considered inadmissible since the complainants were not directly aﬀected by
these acts and thus could not challenge them via constitutional complaint. The
Court also dismissed the challenges against the acts of participation of the
German representative in those bodies, holding that the alleged violation of
the integration responsibility of the Federal Parliament was insuﬃciently
substantiated.100
The Bundesverfassungsgericht reaﬃrmed that the democratic principle
allowed challenges against actions of the Bundestag that eroded its role as an
eﬀective representative of the citizens. The judges now extended that to include
decisions that could render a present or future parliament not just legally—
through transfer of competences—but practically—eg by binding its ﬁnances
—incapable of fulﬁlling that role. Consequently, budgetary autonomy was
crucial to democratic self-determination and thus part of the constitutional core
identity.101 On the other hand, ﬁnancial commitments were an accepted part of
97 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 340. For a detailed discussion of the limits cf below Part IV.
98 ibid para 249. 99 Kiiver (n 90) 1289–90.
100 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) paras 113–18.
101 ibid paras 101–2.
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Germany’s participation in the European integration process. It was up to the
Bundestag to evaluate Germany’s budgetary capacities and economic strength
and to balance these against the likelihood that the guarantees be realized. So
long as fundamental ﬁscal decisions were taken by, or with the consent of, the
Bundestag, they would not violate the constitutional core even if they reached
substantial proportions.102 In order to exercise its ﬁscal responsibility, the
Bundestag had to ensure it retained a decisive inﬂuence on the decisions taken
in these mechanisms, in particular situations even on a case-by-case basis.103
At the same time, the Court emphasized that it had to respect the prerogative of
the legislator, which prevented it from substituting its own assessment of the
risks for that of the elected body and limited its review to evident violations
of the limitations outlined above. ‘Evident’ in this context were decisions that
were unjustiﬁable in light of the amount involved and the potential con-
sequences for budgetary autonomy.104
Applying these principles, the Bundesverfassungsgericht concluded that
the statutes under consideration did not erode the Bundestag’s budgetary
autonomy to the point that it violated the core of the democratic principle. They
did not create an automatic liability and the Bundestag’s assessment about the
potential impact on the budget was constitutionally acceptable.105 Conversely,
the Court did ﬁnd parliamentary control insuﬃcient with regard to the statute
on the EURO stabilization package as it required the Federal Government
merely to try to obtain the approval of the Budget Committee. Instead of
annulling the statute, however, the judges merely required the statute to be
interpreted in line with the constitution, ie as requiring the Committee’s prior
consent, unless it was an emergency.106
The scope of this article does not allow for a comprehensive review of this
decision; however, a few issues are worth highlighting within the present
context. On the one hand, the result is reassuring: the Court retained the
exceptional character of the identity review and avoided unnecessary conﬂict
with the ECJ. On the other hand, compared to the indications from the Lisbon
decision, this case is rather atypical for an identity review. Any conclusions
drawn here might therefore not be applicable to future cases.
With regard to the general approach, this case appears consistent with the
developments in the area of human rights and ultra vires review. The Court
limited its review to violations of the core identity rather than police every single
transgression. Given the scope of the contributions agreed in the mechanisms
under review and the potential impact on the budget, the economy and the lives
of the people living in Germany, the Court’s consideration for the political
stakes involved is remarkable. Even more so, if one recalls that in Lisbon the
Court had identiﬁed ﬁscal autonomy as a sensitive area, emphasizing that
the Bundestag needed to retain ‘suﬃcient political discretion’with regard to the
102 ibid para 124. 103 ibid paras 127–8. 104 ibid para 130.
105 ibid paras 133–5. 106 ibid para 141.
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budget, that a ‘supranationalization to a considerable extent’ would violate the
democratic principle.107 A possible explanation might be that, unlike the
situations envisaged in Lisbon, this case dealt with activities at European level
that took place in the European Council and among the members of the Euro-
group. This meant that the more classical intergovernmental mechanisms—
decisions were taken under the express proviso of national constitutional
compatibility and each Member State had the power to veto further develop-
ments—would ensure Germany a decisive inﬂuence. The Court could thus rely
on these pre-existing options to shape the guidelines for the Bundestag and need
not worry that European acts would become valid without Germany’s express
approval. In a case from within the more supranational institutional framework
this would be diﬀerent, so the Court might not take such a relaxed stance.
Another interesting point is the use of the principle of openness towards
European law. The judges do not refer to it explicitly at that point, but their
comment—that even substantial ﬁnancial commitments were seen as a natural
consequence of Germany’s membership in the European Union—can be
interpreted as an implicit application causing the standard for review to change
for the European context. This could then explain the judges’ reserve in an area
they had identiﬁed in Lisbon as sensitive with regard to further integration
eﬀorts.
Where the case becomes atypical for an identity review is that the Court
reviewed neither the acts of the European institutions nor the participation of
the German representative, not even indirectly. After all, to include such
actions—and potentially declare them inapplicable—had been the primary
reason for the creation of the remedy; and since the Court did review the
German implementation statutes, it would have been possible to at least
comment on the underlying European acts as it did eg in the European
Arrest Warrant Act case. Yet, while both the complainants’ and the Federal
Government’s arguments revolved around exactly that point, the judges
considered a detailed analysis of the relevant European provisions unnecess-
ary. They merely commented that they saw the current regime of the currency
union as presupposing national budgetary autonomy and as aiming to prevent
any liability for another Member State’s debts beyond what was agreed in the
treaties.108 The Court relied on procedural constraints to explain this
reticence,109 but this seems unsatisfying since the judges do not clarify under
what circumstances or by whom such a challenge should be brought and what
their standard for review will be.
Overall, the impact of the case will be diﬃcult to assess. It allows the
tentative conclusion that the identity review will not develop into a threat, but it
107 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 256.
108 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 129.
109 ibid para 116.
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does not establish general guidelines for the German institutions on how to
prevent or avoid violations of core identity values.
C. The Integration Responsibilities of the Federal Parliament
Another facet of the Court’s attitude towards European integration is illustrated
by its approach to the institutions and their activities. While Brunner had
strongly emphasized the duties of the European institutions with regard to
respecting the Member States’ rights, the focus in Lisbon is far more on the
duties ‘incumbent upon German constitutional bodies’.110 The Federal
Parliament and Government are identiﬁed as carrying the primary responsi-
bility which has to be realized in the everyday work of the European
institutions (eg while legislating) as well as during a revision of the treaty
system.111 In order to maintain the political responsibility of the Bundestag
as the directly elected representative of the German people, the German
representative in the Council could only act with prior instruction by the
Bundestag in certain situations, especially regarding any change in primary
law.112 Moreover, the vote on this instruction had to be taken as a formal
statute requiring the consent of the Bundesrat and in some cases even a two-
thirds majority in both Houses.113 As could be seen in the EURO bailout case,
this requirement applies also to mechanisms established parallel to the existing
treaty system that aﬀect the practical independence of the Bundestag.114
At ﬁrst glance, these guidelines sounds fairly severe. The mandate to
integrate apparently comes at the price of tight internal control to ensure that
the Executive does not use its position in the European institutions to circum-
vent the Grundgesetz’s system of checks and balances. This complements the
principles developed in the European Arrest Warrant Act and Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading System cases regarding accountability especially of the
activities of the Federal Parliament. While so far the activities of the Federal
Government have of course been subject to parliamentary oversight as of right,
the democratic principle now turns this right into a duty, ie reinforces the doc-
trine of parliamentary reserve for the European context. This forces the
parliamentarians to take their role more seriously and not simply rely to on the
Bundesverfassungsgericht to enforce their rights vis-à-vis the Federal
Government.115
However, before one accuses the Court of excessively restricting the
political prerogative of the Government,116 one should consider two things:
ﬁrstly, that from a practical perspective, this is a sensible precaution to curb the
110 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 245 of the English version.
111 ibid paras 242–5.
112 Eg the use of the bridging clauses, but also inter alia the use of art 352 TFEU.
113 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) paras 319, 320, 327, 328 and 365.
114 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 128.
115 Schönberger (n 6) 1217. 116 Eg Murkens (n 5) 548.
The Continuing Myth of Euro-Scepticism? 685
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 25 Feb 2014 IP address: 131.251.254.13
Federal Government’s tendency for too much independent action. Also, other
Member States operate even more general systems of parliamentary control,117
hence it is unlikely that these requirements will cause unacceptable delays at
European level, as could be seen in eg the EURO bailout case.118 Secondly,
and more importantly, such control mechanisms are not necessarily that
eﬀective in practice since in parliamentary democracies like Germany, the
government will generally be able to rely on its own majority in parliament to
get the required instructions.119 At the same time, experiences from cases of
troop deployment—which are subject to a similar parliamentary reserve—will
have taught the Federal Government not to underestimate the diﬃculties to
obtain the required majorities, especially in the Bundesrat, or the willingness of
Members of both houses of Parliament to challenge the resulting vote before
the Bundesverfassungsgericht.120 Indeed, the involvement of the Bundesrat
might cause considerable problems in this respect, depending on the majority
situation in that house. This should lead to a closer cooperation between
Federal Parliament and Government; it will require in particular the Federal
Government to keep the Bundestag fully informed well ahead of the vote at
European level to give it enough time to hold the necessary debate and vote.
But the Bundestag will have to do more than rely on the information
provided by the Government in order to protect the core powers as identiﬁed by
the Court and to use the options introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (eg the so-
called early warning system)121 to their full eﬀect. The EURO bailout case is a
case in point. The Court allowed the political actors considerable leeway,
without responding to the arguments of the complainants that the political
pressure exercised by the Federal Government prior to the vote had turned
parliamentary participation into mere window dressing,122 ie the opposite of
what was intended by Lisbon. One could argue this shows rather too much
appreciation for the political stakes involved. On the other hand, it would have
been diﬃcult if not impossible for the Court to deﬁne speciﬁc guidelines as to
what behaviour on the part of the government, or indeed what other political
117 As does eg the UK. For an overview cf inter alia Kiiver (n 90).
118 The EURO stabilization package statute was adopted, authenticated and entered into force
on 07/05/2010. The applicants ﬁled their constitutional complaints on that same day and the
Bundesverfassungsgericht decided on the applications for interim relief mere hours after they had
been ﬁled by the applicants, cf the order of 07/05/2010, Case no 2 BvR 987/10 at <http://www.
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20100507_2bvr098710.html> accessed 8 June
2012.
119 Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says ‘Ja zu
Deutschland!’’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1252; Kiiver (n 90) 1293.
120 Cf eg BVerfG AWACS BVerfGE 121, 135, 153; also BVerfGE 104, 151, 208; BVerfGE 108,
34,43.
121 The Lisbon Treaty in its Protocol (no 2) ‘On the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity
and Proportionality’, [2010] OJ C83/206, introduced rights for national parliaments to object to
European bills before the vote in the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers is taken.
The aim is to allow national parliaments a greater inﬂuence with regard to the adherence to the
subsidiarity principle.
122 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 53.
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factors, could invalidate a parliamentary vote without interfering with the
political prerogative of both Government and Parliament to an unacceptable
degree. It will therefore be up to the Members of the Bundestag themselves
whether the only consequences of the Lisbon requirements will be increased
transparency and public scrutiny123 or whether they will manage to achieve a
measure of actual control. The amendment of the EURO stabilization package
adopted in September 2011 was hailed as move in this direction.124 Despite the
fact that the Court had let the statute stand, the amendment increased the level
of parliamentary participation. As a matter of principle, decisions about
stabilization measures now have to be approved by the Bundestag as a whole.
The Federal Government can involve the Budget Committee only in speciﬁc
situations and this decision in turn is subject to review by the Bundestag.125
The identity review introduced by Lisbon will act as an internal enforcement
mechanism, allowing the Bundestag (especially the opposition), and also
individuals, to challenge any action taken without prior instruction, thus
ensuring that the Federal Government adheres to the strict Lisbon-guidelines.
Moreover, in the EURO bailout case, the judges expanded this to include
violations of the integration responsibility as such. At the same time, they
conﬁrmed that the review will be subject to the principle of openness towards
European law. They held that it requires the German institutions as a matter of
national constitutional law to respect and adhere to European law whenever
they act within the institutional framework of the European Union.126
Consequently, it will not only inﬂuence the activities of the German
representative in the Council, but also the Bundestag’s discretion when
providing such instructions. The Federal Government may even be able to
challenge the constitutionality of a particular vote before the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht in order to have it annulled, in case the Bundestag refuses to
authorize steps for further integration although they would not threaten
Germany’s constitutional identity. Used creatively by both Government
and Parliament, the procedural mechanisms can be both a threat and an
opportunity, the latter especially the earlier in the decision-making process the
instructions are requested.
123 Cf also the arguments of Kiiver (n 118) 1295.
124 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Breite Mehrheit für Ausweitung des Rettungsfonds’ (Press release
of 29/09/2011) <http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/aktuell/35862641_kw39_de_europa.jsp>
accessed 8 June 2012. In the debate during the ﬁnal reading, Volker Kauder (the parliamentary
leader of the conservative CDU party) hailed this new regime as a ‘paradigm shift’ towards a new
relationship between the Federal Government and the Bundestag in matters of parliamentary
scrutiny. Gregor Gysi (leader of the opposition party ‘Die Linke’) on the other hand heavily
criticized the level of secrecy still involved under the new regime.
125 This has already been conﬁrmed in BVerfG EFSF/ Bundestag’s participation rights, Case
no 2 be 8/11, decision of 28/02/2012 [unreported], <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
entscheidungen/es20120228_2bve000811.html> accessed 8 June 2012. For an English language
press release cf <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg12-014en.html>
accessed 8 June 2012.
126 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 109.
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It has been argued that the requirements outlined above were established to
safeguard German sovereignty.127 However, as seen above, they would not be
very eﬀective in this respect, but then again they were not meant to serve as
such. The Court is not concerned that eg the bridging clauses will be used at all
but that, when the decision about their use is taken, it is done by the institution
that the German people elected for that very purpose, thus ensuring that the
democratic principle retains its full eﬀect also during decision making within
the European context. Also considering that such requirements mirror the very
demands for more participation of national Parliaments at European level that
featured highly during the process of drafting the Constitutional Treaty as well
as the Lisbon Treaty, it would be diﬃcult to interpret them as mere expressions
of euro-hostility.128
D. Self-Restraint Carried Further
The cases reviewed above provide essential insights as to the scope and
inﬂuence of the principle of openness towards European Law. As indicated
above, it seems to create a general presumption in favour of the European
Union. Without providing a speciﬁc deﬁnition, the Court used it to derive
speciﬁc duties for the Federal Government and Parliament and even for itself
that in turn have shaped and will continue to shape the relationship between
European and national constitutional law. It has acted as substantive and
procedural limitation on the review powers. The EURO bailout case indicates
that it could serve as a justiﬁcation for the Federal Government and Parliament
to agree to further steps of the integration process. Moreover, it seems to turn
the principle of loyal cooperation into a principle of national constitutional
law.129 The parallels are certainly obvious, including the pervasive inﬂuence of
either. However, how far both will overlap and lead to similar results is still
uncertain at this stage. Either way, the principle of openness towards European
law could turn into a powerful tool for the promotion of European integration.
The case law also shows how the Lisbon principles have reshaped the
Brunner guidelines with regard to the interaction between the Federal
Government and Parliament as well as that between the European and the
national level. After the decision in Mangold, a successful challenge under the
ultra vires review seems as unrealistic as a reversal of Solange II and the EURO
bailout decision seems to indicate that the identity review might develop in a
similar manner. As in the area of implementation of European law, it will
depend on the Federal Government and Parliament how much actual impact
either review power will have on their decisions and on decisions of the
European institutions. The Court certainly does not intend to use them to
127 Claimed eg by Doukas (n 4) 876.
128 Cf the conclusions drawn by Murkens (n 5) 550.
129 BVerfG Griechenland-Hilfe/ EURO-Rettungschirm (n 8) para 109.
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censure activities of the political actors; rather—as the case law before Lisbon
already indicated—their application appears as a means of last resort and
allows the political actors a lot of leeway to implement their chosen course of
action. The political centre stage is left to the institutions elected and appointed
to take it—a logical consequence of the Court’s notion of democracy as
expressed in the Lisbon decision.
It now remains to be seen whether a similar conclusion can be drawn with
regard to future development of the integration process.
IV. THE FUTURE INTEGRATION PROCESS
While Parts II and III concerned issues that will aﬀect the day-to-day work of
the European and German institutions under the current treaty system, this last
part will examine issues that aﬀect the interaction of European law and national
law at the earliest possible point in time, ie when the Member States plan for
the next amendment treaty or for concerted action at European level. This is the
area where the Bundesverfassungsgericht seems the least inclined to
compromise, ie where it sees the inﬂuence of the Grundgesetz at its strongest.
This is the main reason the Lisbon decision is much more critical than eg
Mangold. Unlike the latter, the review of an amendment treaty requires the
Court to assess not only the new treaty ‘as is’ but also the likely development
of the integration process during its implementation, based on past experience
in particular with the proactive style of the European institutions.
To the disappointment of many, Lisbon clearly reﬂects the Court’s
apprehensions about the potential threats to the system of democratic
governance as established by the Grundgesetz. The judges set explicit
conditions for further integration and marked particular issues as still needing
considerable attention before any further steps could be taken. The general
impression was that they had set the threshold so high as to at least hinder if not
close oﬀ any further eﬀorts at European integration.130
It will now be examined whether the mandate to integrate and the principle
of openness towards European law might exert their inﬂuence also in this area
to allow for an interpretation more favourable to future integration than a ﬁrst
impression of the Lisbon decision might indicate.
A. The Limits of Competence Transfer
The Court unequivocally reaﬃrmed, and expanded on, the limits set out in
Brunner: the core of unalterable values was ‘not amenable to integration’,131
the principle of democracy in particular was ‘inviolable’,132 a transfer of
130 Inter alia Schönberger (n 6) 1209.
131 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 235 of the English version.
132 ibid para 216 of the English version.
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Kompetenz-Kompetenz was not possible and whatever the extent of the
competence transfer, the Member States had to ‘retain suﬃcient space for the
political formation of the economic, cultural and social circumstances of life’,
especially in ‘essential areas of democratic formative action’ as deﬁned by the
Court.133
These limits for future competence transfers sound severe indeed; especially
the list of essential state tasks appear at ﬁrst glance as an absolute limit on any
future competence transfers with respect to the listed areas.134 However, such a
conclusion is borne out neither by the Court’s further reasoning in the Lisbon
decision itself nor by the current state of European law. The Court itself
declared that the democratic principle in combination with the principle of
openness towards European law did not require that a certain number or
speciﬁc types of competences had to remain with the Member States. The
judges openly acknowledged that the reality of how power is shared between
the Member States and the European Union does not follow the traditional
concept of a domaine réservé.135 Moreover, the scope of competences of
the EC prior to the Lisbon Treaty already provided the Community with
opportunities to legislate in areas the judges listed as essential,136 and the
European Union post-Lisbon has even more inﬂuence.137 Indeed, if one
considers how much—or rather how little—independent power the Member
States actually have left to retain a decisive inﬂuence on eg the economic life
of their citizens, one is left to wonder how low the Court set the base line,
given that the Lisbon Treaty is deemed not to violate it.138 Moreover, as both
the ECJ and the Bundesverfassungsgericht have stressed, even if a particular
piece of national legislation were to be enacted within the exclusive com-
petence of the Member States, it would still come under the inﬂuence of
European law, should the subject matter overlap.139 It is therefore submitted
that this enumeration should rather be seen as constituting a list of sensitive
areas where future integration eﬀorts should be preceded by considered
reﬂection on the part of the Member States rather than be the object of political
133 ibid para 249 of the English version: ‘Essential areas of democratic formative action
comprise, inter alia, citizenship, the civil and the military monopoly on the use of force, revenue
and expennditure including external ﬁnancing and all elements of encroachment that are decisive
for the realization of fundamental rights, above all as regards intensive encroachments on
fundamental rights such as the deprivation of liberty in the administration of criminal law or
the placement in an institution. These important areas also include cultural issues such as
the disposition of language, the shaping of circumstances concerning the family and education, the
ordering of the freedom of opinion, of the press and of association and the dealing with the
profession of faith or ideology.’
134 Murkens (n 5) 539; Schorkopf (n 60) 1230.
135 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 248.
136 Eg in the area of social policy, BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 393.
137 Eg in the areas of cooperation in criminal matters and taxes and with regard to the impact of
European law on human rights protection in general.
138 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 351.
139 Cf eg BVerfG Mangold (n 7) para 73 and ECJ C–555/07 Kücükdeveci, [2010] ECR I–365,
para 51.
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package deals.140 Consequently, any assessment of whether or not future treaty
amendments will leave the Member States ‘suﬃcient space’ to shape those
areas will depend more on the quality than the quantity of the remaining
competences.141
Moreover, the inﬂuence of the mandate to integrate and the principle of
openness towards European law should not be underestimated even in this
area. As already pointed out, in Lisbon the Bundesverfassungsgericht stressed
that it was ‘not left to the political discretion [of the constitutional institutions]
whether or not they participate in European integration’.142 This could be
interpreted as limiting the Federal Government’s prerogative to make a
political decision about whether or not to remain in the European Union,
an option that in other Member States is naturally part of a government’s
prerogative.143 Based on Lisbon, however, it seems that the Federal
Government needs to claim that the road the European Union is taking
violates the standards set out above, which would then trigger a constitutional
duty to withdraw.144 However, that claim in turn might be subject to review by
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on the application of eg members of the
opposition in the Bundestag, which would allow the Court to curb any Euro-
hostile attitudes of future Federal Governments or indeed Parliaments. In
the case of amendment treaties, the mandate could be seen as creating a
presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the planned competence
transfer. It will also inﬂuence the overall assessment of how the planned
transfer correlates with the space the Member States still have left in areas
where competences have already been transferred. As the Court has repeatedly
stressed, the principle of subsidiarity plays an important role in maintaining the
balance of power between the Member States and the European Union as it was
intended by the former. Any assessment of how much inﬂuence the Member
States have retained as a whole to shape the life of their citizens will therefore
impact on the question of how many additional competences may be trans-
ferred to the European Union.
It has been argued that the politically accountable institutions like the
Federal Government or Parliament and not a court, even a constitutional one,
should delineate the limits for integration.145 However, while this might be true
for other constitutional systems, this is not the case for the German context, not
under the current constitution. From the Court’s perspective, the limits outlined
in Brunner and Lisbon stem from the core constitutional values that the eternity
clause146 reserves to the sovereign decision of the German people alone, ie
they are protected from constitutional amendment by precisely those politically
140 For a similar assessment cf eg Schorkopf (n 60) 1238 or Thym (n 65) 1800.
141 As the Court itself pointed out, BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 351.
142 ibid para 225.
143 As repeatedly stressed by the UK. For further examples cf eg Kiiver, (n 90) 1292ﬀ.
144 As established by BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 264.
145 Schönberger (n 6) 1210. 146 Art 79 (3) GG.
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accountable institutions. Therefore, if the Federal Government and Parliament
do not even have the power to make decisions about these values in a purely
national context, it follows that they do not have the power to delineate the limits
of Germany’s commitment to European integration in this respect either.147
Moreover, given the historical origins of the eternity clause as a safeguard
against the subversion or destruction of the constitutional checks and balances
from within, it makes sense to use it in the European context as a means to
prevent the political actors from assuming power over decisions that—to the
Court—are not theirs to make in the ﬁrst place.148 It is therefore consistent for
the Court to control these limits in the same way as it reviews compliance with
the eternity clause in general. Whether or not the EURO bailout decision is any
indication as to the level of scrutiny applied in this context remains to be seen.
B. The Democratic Deﬁcit as the More Crucial Limit
While the limitations outlined above are not interpreted as setting absolute
limits, much of their ﬂexibility will depend on how another controversial issue
is resolved by the Member States as well as the European Union: the
democratic deﬁcit. Despite the changes introduced over the last two decades
and the mechanisms of participatory democracy introduced by the Lisbon
Treaty, the Lisbon decision made it clear that the Court considered the
European Parliament as still lacking in democratic legitimacy and thus unable
to fully legitimize action at Union level.149 In essence, it rejected the adoption
of a more ﬂexible approach to the democratic principle simply to accommodate
the functionality of the European Union: the Union’s sui generis nature could
not excuse its lack of democratic credentials, especially not if all hopes are
pinned solely on the European Parliament.150 Consequently, future compe-
tence transfers will only be possible if the level of democratic legitimization
increases correspondingly.151
This reasoning has been criticized as a negative derogation from Brunner
and as a rigid application of the Court’s own constitutional standards to an
entity that is still developing its own concept of democratic legitimacy and is
now cruelly stiﬂed in those eﬀorts.152 Moreover, the rejection of the European
Parliament in favour of legitimization primarily through national parliaments
would only serve to replace one seemingly insuﬃcient mechanism with
an ineﬀective one.153 It also seems to leave the European Union in an
uncomfortable double bind in that it cannot seem to further its democratization
without violating the limits to further integration established by the Court.154
147 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 218. 148 Grimm (n 57) 367.
149 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 280. 150 Succinctly argued by Kiiver (n 91) 1291.
151 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 262.
152 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1248 and 1252; Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Ruling of the
German Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 1261.
153 Thym (n 65) 1812. 154 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1251.
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These pessimistic interpretations have in turn been criticized for ignoring
the generalist nature of the Court’s reasoning which allowed room for
more positive conclusions. The admittedly clear demotion of the European
Parliament to a mere ‘representation of the peoples of the Member States’155—
as opposed to that of one European demos—is taken as a ‘salutary warning’
that the European Parliament alone cannot legitimize the activities of the
European Union. Thus, the Member States should not become complacent in
their eﬀorts to democratize the structures of the Union as a whole if they want
to push for further integration.156 It was therefore considered to be consistent of
the Court to conclude that at the current state of integration the European Union
needed the national parliaments to provide the necessary democratic legitimacy
in order to compensate for its own lack thereof.157
These latter interpretations are more consistent with the Court’s actual
attitude as it has been deduced in this article. In particular, they emphasize the
correlation of both the national and the European facets of the integration
responsibility of the German constitutional institutions. While the active
involvement of the Federal Parliament is constitutionally necessary within the
national context, it is crucial at European level to provide the European Union
with the level of democratic legitimacy it needs to allow Germany’s
participation as a member state. Moreover, they highlight why the Court sees
the democratic deﬁcit as the greatest obstacle to further integration: in the
current political reality, the state is still seen as a necessary structure to provide
the ‘basis of individual freedom and collective self-determination’158 of its
people, in essence the preservation of their human dignity.159 The state cannot
absolve itself from that duty by transferring power to another entity without
making very sure that the people in its care will still be able to exercise that
individual and collective freedom through a system of democratic govern-
ance.160 At the same time, there are various courses of action open to the
European Union to remedy the deﬁcit without creating the perceived double
bind.161
C. The Limits of Self-Restraint
Given the sensitive nature of the issues examined above, it is perhaps not
surprising that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s approach in this area shows
greater reluctance to have the practicalities of European law overrule the
democratic standards of the Grundgesetz. Despite its apparent apprehensions,
155 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 284 of the English version.
156 Kiiver (n 90) 1291; Michael Waibel, ‘A good day and salutary warning for the European
Union’ (2010) 69 CLJ 38. 157 Halberstam and Möllers (n 118) 1247.
158 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 224 of the English version.
159 ibid para 211.
160 For a similar conclusion cf inter alia Schorkopf (n 60) 1222.
161 For suggestions cf eg Thym (n 66) 1820.
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however, the Court allowed the most fundamental change in the European
treaty system to pass, albeit with clear guidelines for the further integration
process. This leaves the impression that the Grundgesetz is still fairly ﬂexible
and one is left to wonder where exactly the Bundesverfassungsgericht will
draw the line, since, it is submitted, the Lisbon Treaty does not seem to be it.
Equally, the mandate to integrate and the principle of openness towards
European law showed themselves as a potentially positive inﬂuence even in an
area where the Court clearly feels apprehensive about further developments.
Then again, the Court itself considered the currently existing democratic deﬁcit
to be tolerable. In light of the current state of European integration, that
conclusion in itself is testament to the Court’s commitment to, and support for,
the integration process.
Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that the Court did set one limit
where there seems to be no room for ﬂexibility: should the issues around the
democratic deﬁcit not be resolved, Germany might ultimately have to withdraw
from the European Union as a matter of constitutional necessity.162
V. LISBON AS A RELIABLE GUIDE TO THE COURT’S ATTITUDE?
With regard to the question initially raised, the analysis has shown that the
Lisbon decision in conjunction only with Brunner is not a reliable guide to
gauging the Court’s actual attitude towards European integration. It needs to be
interpreted within the context of how German constitutional law as a whole
interacts with European law. Separating out the diﬀerent scenarios of that
interaction has highlighted how the various strands of the Court’s case law
integrate European law within their respective contexts but also how those
strands inﬂuence each other and thus necessarily shape any analysis of the
Lisbon decision. The case will still provide the theoretical groundwork for
assessments of the future integration process, but the actual limits to European
integration will be drawn in more practical decisions like Mangold and the
EURO bailout. In this, it is most interesting to see the pervasive inﬂuence the
principle of Openness towards European Law has already developed, reaching
even into areas that the Court is most anxious to protect. It is the application of
this principle, not individual elements of the Lisbon decision seen out of
context, which will provide reliable guidance for future cases.
The principle’s impact is of course directly linked to the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht’s actual attitude towards European integration that is far more
positive and supportive than critics claim it to be. While this author does
not intend to downplay the Court’s apprehensions clearly displayed in the
Lisbon decision, it is submitted that the Bundesverfassungsgericht is not a
threat to European integration. Indeed, to continue to see the Court through a
162 BVerfG Lissabon (n 3) para 264. cf above Part IVA.
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‘Brunner-lens’ of euro-scepticism runs the risk of dismissing its apprehensions
as mere expressions of that perceived hostility instead of taking them
seriously.
However, there is one issue on which the Lisbon decision may be considered
as reliable guidance: it illustrates the ﬁne line the Bundesverfassungsgericht
walks in trying to ensure eﬀective implementation of European law without
sacriﬁcing the integrity of the constitution it is duty-bound to protect. These
eﬀorts have resulted in some rather uncomfortable consequences for the
Federal Government and Parliament and the German courts who sometimes
found themselves between a European rock and a hard German place. But,
after all, that is the role a constitutional court is supposed to play.
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